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Quantum Digital Signatures (QDS) allow for the exchange of messages from one sender to multi-
ple recipients, with the guarantee that messages cannot be forged or tampered with. Additionally,
messages cannot be repudiated – if one recipient accepts a message, she is guaranteed that others
will accept the same message as well. While messaging with these types of security guarantees are
routinely performed in the modern digital world, current technologies only offer security under com-
putational assumptions. QDS, on the other hand, offer security guaranteed by quantum mechanics.
All thus far proposed variants of QDS require long-term, high quality storage of quantum infor-
mation, making them unfeasible in the foreseeable future. Here, we present the first QDS scheme
where no quantum memory is required, and all quantum information processing can be performed
using just linear optics. This makes QDS feasible with current technology.
PACS numbers:
Introduction.— Quantum Digital Signatures (QDS), originally proposed in [1], is an unconditionally secure cryp-
tographic primitive for the exchange of classical messages between one sender and multiple receivers with two types
of security guarantees: security against forging and security against repudiation. Security against forging guarantees
that none of the recipients (or other parties) can forge a message, or alter a message which is sent from the sender
to one of the recipients. Security against repudiation (sometimes called transferability [1]) implies that a malevolent
sender cannot cause two (or more) recipients to disagree on the validity of a message. Currently, these two types of
security guarantees for message sending are achieved using classical public-key based digital signatures (DS) protocols,
and are constantly required in modern communication. The key advantage of QDS over traditionally used schemes is
in the flavor of security – DS offer security under computational assumptions [19] whereas the security in QDS holds
against computationally unbounded adversaries.
In a generic QDS protocol the sender sends (a bounded number of) copies of pairs quantum states to the multiple
receivers. These states, which we will refer to as quantum signatures, are then kept in quantum memory by the
recipients, until the sender decides to send a particular message. Authenticity is effectively guaranteed by the fact
that a limited amount of information in the emitted quantum signatures is accessible to potential forgers. Non-
repudiability is enforced by having the recipients perform some type of non-destructive quantum state comparison
on the initially sent quantum signatures (for instance, a SWAP test [1]). Although general non-destructive state
comparison is currently beyond experimental limits, in [2] a QDS scheme based on coherent states was proposed, where
the comparison can be performed using simple linear optics. This scheme was recently implemented experimentally [3].
However, the remaining and more challenging requirement for viable QDS is the quantum memory, which may have
to store millions of qubits (or qumodes), coherently, perhaps for months or years. This is a substantially impractical
requirement given that state-of-the-art memories cannot achieve coherence times beyond the scale of minutes [4].
In this Paper we circumvent the requirement of quantum memory. We propose a QDS scheme with the same
security guarantees as those in [1–3], but without the need of quantum memory. The scheme can be implemented
using just linear optics and photodetectors that distinguish only between zero and non-zero photons.
QDS without quantum memory.— QDS protocols can be separated into two stages: the distribution stage, where
quantum signatures are sent to all future recipients, and the messaging stage, where classical messages are sent and
verified. In its simplest form, the distribution stage enables a sender (Alice) to send a message to either or both of
two recipients (Bob and Charlie) at some point in the future (during the messaging stage). The distribution stage is
independent of the future message sent in the messaging stage. The main difference between our protocol and previous
protocols is in the first stage. While existing protocols end with the recipients storing quantum states in quantum
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2FIG. 1: The multiport: The out-signal arms contain a state symmetric under a swap. The null-ports contain the vacuum if
and only if the in-signal arms contained a symmetric state. In active cheating Bob can choose what state η he sends back to
Charlie, so as to optimize his cheating strategies. However, Charlie’s null-port counts measure the fidelity between honest and
dishonest states η. In the figure, η is set to the honest response state.
memory for future use, in our protocol, those states are immediately measured. Thus, only classical information has
to be stored. We will show that the classical measurement outcomes at the end of the distribution stage can still be
used for secure distribution of messages, thus eliminating the need for quantum memory.
Our QDS protocol is based on the QDS scheme proposed in [2]. For simplicity, we will consider the case with two
receivers, but will explain how this can be generalized later. The quantum signatures comprise trains of coherent
states randomly chosen by Alice as |α〉 or | − α〉. In the scheme we present here, just as in [2, 3], non-repudiability is
ensured by the use of a multiport, shown in Figure 1. The multiport is a passive linear optical device comprising four
50:50 beam splitters . The top two belong to Bob and the bottom two to Charlie. The input states to both Bob’s
and Charlie’s first beam splitters are a vacuum state and the inbound state from Alice. The outputs of the first two
beam splitters comprise the inputs of the second two beams splitters, as shown in Fig. 1. We will refer to the output
ports of the second two beam splitters as Bob’s and Charlie’s signal port and null-port, respectively.
Intuitively, the multiport non-destructively [20] compares the coherent states entering at Bob’s and Charlie’s in-
ports. Non-repudiability is, however, guaranteed in a somewhat different way. There are two properties which make
the multiport central for the security of the QDS scheme. Firstly, it symmetrizes inbound states. More precisely, for
any input state, the joint state of Bob’s and Charlie’s quantum signatures, exiting from their signal ports, is invariant
under swap of every matching quantum signature element pair (see Appendix I for details). This will guarantee
security against repudiation, even without considering the counts on the null-ports, that is, without actively checking
whether Alice sends in identical states. Secondly, the null-port counts can serve as a safeguard against forgers who act
maliciously in the distribution stage as we will shortly describe. Similar to all other QDS proposals, we assume that
player-to-player classical communication is performed over an authenticated (but not confidential) classical channel,
and that the quantum channel from Alice to the (multiport in-ports of) the recipients is authenticated as well. The
classical authenticated channels can easily be realized using a classical message authentication scheme with a small
overhead of pre-shared keys. The requirement for the quantum authenticated channel we address in the concluding
discussion.
At the end of the distribution stage, the received quantum signatures are measured using unambiguous state dis-
crimination (USD) [5–7], which for the case of the two coherent states of opposite phase can be optimally realized using
linear optics alone [8]. An unambiguous quantum measurement gives a result that is (in the ideal case) guaranteed
to be correct, at the expense of sometimes failing to give a result at all. In the subsequent messaging stage, Alice
accompanies a message with the information about what signs she chose for the corresponding sequence of coherent
states, and the recipients verify that a low enough number of signs – the declared phases of the coherent states – fail
to match those measured during the distribution stage.
A more specific protocol outline is given next. The basic protocol describes how single-bit messages can be securely
3distributed. For longer messages, the distribution stage of the protocol is simply iterated, and all bits of the message
are later checked in the also iterated messaging stage. We will introduce a number of internal parameters which have
to be appropriately chosen. We also introduce an external parameter L, the choice of which directly influences the
security levels of our scheme. Finally, we introduce pUSD = 1− e−2α2 , which is the optimal success probability of an
unambiguous discrimination of the states {|α〉 , |−α〉} [5–8].
Distribution stage
1. For each possible future message k = 0, 1, Alice generates two copies of a sequence of coherent states (called
quantum signatures) QuantSigk =
⊗L
l=1 ρ
k
l where ρ
k
l = |bkl α〉〈bkl α|, α is a real positive amplitude, bkl ∈ {−1, 1}
are randomly chosen signs, and L is a suitably chosen integer. The state QuantSigk and the sequence of signs
PrivKeyk = (b
k
1 , . . . b
k
L) are called the quantum signature and the private key, respectively, for message k. The
individual state ρkl we refer to as the l
th quantum signature element state for message k.
2. Alice sends one copy of QuantSigk to Bob and one to Charlie, for each possible message k = 0 and k = 1.
3. Bob and Charlie send their sequences QuantSigk for both k = 0 and k = 1, one signature element at a time,
through the QDS multiport, shown in Fig. 1. For each signature element they note whether photons are registered
at their multiport null-port.
4. Bob and Charlie each measure all the multiport signal states using the USD measurement for {|α〉 , |−α〉}. They
store the unambiguous outcomes (along with the index of the state for which it occurred) for k = 0, 1. Thus they
obtain and store triplets of the form {(k, l′, bkl′)} where 1 ≤ l′ ≤ L.
Messaging stage
1. For the bit message m, Alice sends (m,PrivKeym) to the desired recipient (say Bob).
2. To authenticate, Bob checks whether (m,PrivKeym) matches with his measured stored sequence, for the positions
where he obtained the unambiguous outcome. He authenticates if the number of mismatches is below sapUSDL,
where sa is an authentication threshold.
3. Before accepting the message, Bob confirms he has no reason to abort the protocol, by checking the following
two things. (a) If the number of signature elements for which non-zero null-port counts are registered breaches
a threshold rL for 0 ≤ r < 1 he aborts. (b) If the number of unambiguous outcomes is not inside the expected
interval [(pUSD − δ)L, (pUSD + δ)L], where 0 < δ < 1 is called the unambiguous count tolerance, he aborts.
4. To forward the message to Charlie, Bob forwards to Charlie the pair (m,PrivKeym) he received from Alice.
Charlie then performs an analogous procedure to Bob, where he verifies the message if the number of mismatches
is below svpUSDL where sv is called the verification threshold, with 0 ≤ sa < sv < 1.
5. For Charlie to accept the message, he also confirms that he has no reason to abort the protocol, by repeating the
steps Bob did above.
In the description above, the roles Bob and Charlie play are arbitrary. One player performs the authentication
procedure, whereas the other the verification of the forwarded message.
Protocol performance.— We will be interested in three performance properties of this protocol: correctness, security
against repudiation and security against forging. Another important property, robustness, which guarantees that the
protocol will work even if physical imperfections are considered, we address briefly later in this Paper, and leave a
more thorough analysis for future work. Below we will show that the probabilities of incorrect behavior, forging and
repudiation events decay exponentially in L, for an appropriate choice of the internal parameters. We will also show
that there exists a consistent assignment of these parameters which yields an exponential decay of the probabilities
of all the undesired events. Note that in the three-player setting it only makes sense to consider scenarios where at
most one player is malevolent, since two or more malevolent players can always trivially cheat on the third.
Correctness: Correctness for our protocol implies that if all parties behave honestly (and no imperfections are
present), then the protocol is aborted only with a negligible probability, and the message is accepted by the recipients.
In our protocol an honest case abort can only occur if either the number of unambiguous outcomes either of the parties
obtains is outside the tolerance window [pUSD − δ, pUSD + δ]. This occurs with probability
P (honest abort) ≤ (1− 2 exp (−2δ2L))2. (1)
To see this, note that the expected value for the number of unambiguous outcomes, for each player and in the honest
case, is exactly pUSDL. The expression 2 exp
(−2δ2L), by Hoeffding’s inequalities [12], bounds the probability that
the deviation from this mean is larger than δL, and the overall expression takes into account that neither player
should abort.
4Security against repudiation: Repudiation occurs when the protocol is not aborted, the message is authenticated
by one of the parties, but the same message gets rejected when forwarded to an another party. Thus, in this setting,
Alice is the malevolent player, and her strategies effectively comprise the possible choices of quantum states she sends
in the distribution stage.
Security against repudiation relies on the symmetrization property of the multiport – the joint states of Bob’s
and Charlie’s signal ports are invariant under swaps of matching quantum signature elements, and the fact that the
acceptance thresholds sa and sv differ, so that sv > sa. The strong symmetrization property of the multiport implies,
for instance, that the matching reduced density matrices for Bob and Charlie are equal for each key element. That
alone will guarantee the security against individual attacks. However, also when post-selecting on some sequence of
outcomes for Bob and Charlie, for part of the quantum signature elements, the unmeasured remainder of the signatures
is still symmetric under swap of matching elements. The latter property guarantees security against coherent attacks
(see Appendix I for details).
Intuitively, any strategy of Alice, besides the honest one, will yield a certain average fraction of mismatches (a
fraction Alice can control) between the declared private key, and the signs measured using the USD. Since Bob’s and
Charlie’s reduced states are equal, and the declarations they compare their measurement outcomes with are equal, the
fraction of mismatches will, on average, be equal for both players. So, it is not possible for Alice to deterministically
both make Bob observe less than sapUSDL mismatches and Charlie to observe more than svpUSDL mismatches.
Alice’s only freedom is to choose the average number of mismatches, which can occur for either Bob and Charlie
with equal probabilities. It can be shown that her optimal choice is (sv − sa)pUSD/2. In this case, the bound on the
probability of Alice successfully repudiating is given by
P (repudiation) ≤ exp
(
−1
2
p2USD(sv − sa)2L
)
. (2)
Eq. (2) again stems from Hoeffding’s inequalities, which give the probability that the number of matches deviates
from the expectancy by more than a fraction, as a function of L. The full proof of this claim is more involved and
can be found in Appendix I. It also shows that using classical correlations or entanglement does not help Alice.
Security against forging: By forging we denote the scenario where a dishonest recipient convinces an honest recipient
that Alice has sent a message when Alice has sent no message at all (message forging), or a message m′ differing
from the message m Alice has in fact sent (message tampering). For our setting, the probability of successful message
tampering equals the probability of message forging, as the private keys for two differing messages are independently
distributed. Without loss of generality, we will assume that the forging party is Bob.
We identify different types of forging attacks. Firstly, we distinguish between passive and active attacks. In
passive attacks, Bob behaves honestly in the distribution stage until step 4 of the protocol. Here, he stores all the
quantum systems outbound from the multiport in quantum memory, and performs measurements which will optimize
his cheating probability. In active attacks, Bob acts maliciously throughout the distribution stage. Specifically, Bob
can tamper with his part of the multiport.
Secondly, we distinguish between individual, collective and coherent attacks. This classification is reminiscent
of the traditionally studied attacks in quantum key distribution (QKD) [10]. In individual attacks, Bob’s actions
(whether it is measuring the quantum signature or tampering with his section of the multiport) are independent for
each signature element. In collective attacks, he may use only strategies which are classically correlated for different
signature elements. For coherent attacks we remove this last constraint, allowing quantum correlations. Such attacks
constitute the most general type of forging activity. Here, we will address the security of our protocol both for
passive and active attacks, for individual and collective attacks, and leave the analysis of coherent attacks for future
work. Intuitively, since different signature elements are independent, Bob should have nothing to gain from quantum
correlations.
In passive attacks, Bob’s goal is to make Charlie accept PrivKeym′ for the single bit messagem
′ of his choice. Note
that knowing PrivKeym′⊕1 for message m
′ ⊕ 1 does not help, since the signs of the two messages are independently
distributed. Similarly, since all the signs within one private key are independently distributed, the optimal collective
forging strategy can be shown to be (see Appendix I) performing minimum-error measurements [9] on each of the
signature elements in QuantSigm′. The results of the minimum-error measurements are reported to Charlie who then
checks them against his unambiguous outcomes. Let pmin be the minimum-error probability, i.e. the probability that
Bob incorrectly identifies a quantum signature element, and let pUSD be the probability of obtaining the unambiguous
outcome in the USD measurement. For the case of two states it holds that [5–7]
pmin = 1− 1
2
(√
1− e−4α2 + 1
)
. (3)
For Bob to successfully forge with Charlie (that is, have a faked message verified, which is easier than to forge a
transferrable message as sa < sv), Bob must correctly guess a fraction of the unambiguous measurement outcomes
5Charlie obtained. Since forging by definition can occur only if Charlie did not abort, Charlie has received at least
p′USDL unambiguous outcomes, for p
′
USD = pUSD − δ. This lower bound is also the best scenario for forger Bob, and
for this case one can derive the bound
P (forge) ≤ exp
(
−2
(
pmin − sv pUSD
p′USD
)2
p′USDL
)
. (4)
By setting δ = 0, Eq. (4) would bound the probability of Bob making an error in his estimate of the encoded phases
fewer than svpUSDL times, out of pUSDL guesses.
In active individual attacks, Bob can prepare response states, denoted η, shown in Fig. 1, which modifies Charlie’s
quantum signature states. To counteract such attacks, Charlie must keep track of the multiport null-port counts in
the distribution stage, as they measure the effective fidelity between the passive-strategy response state and an active
one (see Appendix I). Requiring that these output ports yield no detection events (i.e. setting r = 0) implies, in the
asymptotic limit of infinite signature states L → ∞, that Bob must have been honest throughout the distribution
stage. This reduces active individual attacks to passive attacks. For collective attacks, it is easy to see that the space
of collective strategies forms a convex structure, and the optimal cheating probability is achieved at an extremal point
– which corresponds to an individual attack. Thus collective strategies are no better than individual. However, this
reasoning does not simply extend to coherent attacks, which we leave for future work. We provide more details, and
quantitative security statements in Appendix I.
Robustness and parameter constraints: Equations (1),(2) and (4) constrain the internal parameters to ensure
exponential decay in the probability of an unwanted event, as a function of L. Concretely, as long as δ > 0 and
sv < pmin(pUSD − δ)pUSDpmin (say δ = pUSD/10 and sv = pmin/4) we get the desired exponential decay. The
parameters r and sa can in the ideal case be set to 0. We have however left these parameters in the expressions
and the protocol definition, as they can be used to counteract imperfections which will occur in any realization. For
instance, if the USD procedure is not perfect, there may be a mismatch even if everybody is honest, and this can be
ameliorated by having a non-zero sa. Similarly, multiport null-port counts can occur even if everybody is honest, for
instance through detector dark counts. This can be counteracted by setting r > 0. However, the detailed analyses of
the imperfect settings are beyond the scope of this Paper. See Appendix I for an analysis taking into account slight
modifications due to active forging.
We have assumed that all the players share a common trusted reference frame, which is necessary for the phase of
the coherent states to be defined. This could be realized by having a fourth party send sequences of strong reference
pulses of a known amplitude, defining the phase 0. Alternatively, Alice could send time-multiplexed pairs of signal-
idler coherent states, where the idler serves as the reference beam, as was implemented in [3]. In this case, the security
analysis would be slightly different (as the reference beam could be tampered with) but with minor modifications our
results would still hold. The full analysis of this we also leave for future work.
Discussion.— Our protocol is easily generalized in many ways. First, using a generalized version of the multiport
[2] it is easily extended to any number of recipients. Moreover, the quantum signatures could be chosen from more
than two possible quantum states, for instance the states
∣∣eiθα〉 with θ = 2kπ/N, k = 0, . . .N − 1. For N > 2,
unambiguous discrimination cannot be performed optimally using linear optics (except in the asymptotic limit). Non-
optimal schemes, or asymptotically optimal schemes, such as proposed in [13–15], or state elimination schemes may
however be good enough. It remains an open and highly non-trivial question, even in the ideal case, which choice of
α and N maximizes the security level for given key lengths.
More generally, we can envisage qubit-based QDS schemes, or schemes based on linearly dependent sets of states,
where USD is not possible [11]. For example, it would be interesting to investigate schemes using the BB84 states, using
minimum-error measurements or quantum state elimination. A remaining issue, aside from the security proof against
forging in the most general types of attacks, is the requirement that Alice has an authenticated quantum channel to
each of the recipients. While general quantum message authentication protocols [16] are resource-expensive (unlike
the classical counterparts), in our case, verification of only two possible input states is needed. Thus, potentially,
techniques similar to those used in standard QKD could be employed to verify the channel (by sacrificing a fraction
of the states).
Finally, we note that this protocol, since all the quantum signatures are immediately measured, highlights that
certain types of classical multi-party correlations are sufficient for secure digital signature schemes. It is an interesting
question which types of correlations are sufficient and whether they can be achieved by means other than a QDS-type
distribution stage (for instance by many point-to-point QKD systems).
Support by EPSRC grants No. EP/G009821/1, EP/K022717/1, the EPSRC Doctoral Prize scheme, and partial
support from COST Action MP1006 is gratefully acknowledged.
6I. APPENDIX: SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
A. Outline and Definitions
In this supplementary material we will in detail examine the performance of the protocol, presented in the main
paper. We will prove security against repudiation for any type of attack. As for security against forging, we will prove
the security against all collective active attacks, as defined in the main paper. Recall, in general there are three types
of attacks (for both repudiation and forging) that a malevolent party may use, of increasing generality. The first are
the individual attacks, where the attack happens independently (but not necessarily identically) to each element of
the quantum signature. Second are the collective attacks, where the malevolent party may use (classical) correlations
between the different elements of the quantum signature, but no quantum correlations. Finally, the general coherent
attacks allow the malevolent party to use any possible attack strategy, including entangled correlations between
different elements of the quantum signature.
The outline of this document is as follows. We will first give relevant definitions. We will then prove certain
properties of the multiport, for use in the remainder of the document. Following this we will examine the security
against repudiation, against forging and finally review the correctness of the protocol and give a suitable choice for
the parameters which appear in the protocol.
To remind the reader, the protocol is divided in two stages: the distribution and the messaging stage. During the
distribution stage, Alice sends quantum signatures ⊗Li=1 |biα〉, composed of L coherent states, to Bob and Charlie.
The bi are chosen uniformly at random in {−1, 1}, independently for each of the two possible messages m = 0, 1.
Thus each coherent state in the quantum signature is either |α〉 or | − α〉. By convention, we assume α is real and
non-negative. Bob and Charlie pass the quantum states they receive from Alice through the multiport, and they
measure, using the USD measurement, the resulting state from the signal-port, while they also keep track of the null-
port counts to protect from active forging, as we will see later. We will call the sequence of their outcomes measured
signatures. The probability for obtaining an unambiguous outcome depends on the amplitude of the coherent states
and is given by
pUSD = 1− e−2α
2
. (5)
During the messaging stage, Alice sends, for the desired message m ∈ {0, 1}, the so-called private key PrivKeym
which is the pair of the message m and the classical string {bi}Li=1 to Bob. Here biα defines the coherent state at the
ith position in the quantum signature matching the message m. We will call the classical string defining the phases
of the states Alice’s declaration in the remainder of this paper. As is clear from the protocol definition, the actual
phases, measured or declared, do not directly determine whether Charlie or Bob accept or reject the message. It is
the match or mismatch between the two which solely determines the decisions of Bob and Charlie. Thus, it will be
convenient to define as +1 the event when a measurement by Bob or Charlie matches Alice’s declaration, and as −1
when there is a mismatch. If the USD measurement failed to produce an outcome, we will denote this event 0. This
is equivalent to noting that, since only the match or mismatch matter, we can without loss of generality assume that
Alice declares a string of +1 phases, so that the events −1, 1, 0 defined above coincide exactly with the actual phase
measurement outcomes, with 0 denoting the ambiguous outcome.
As stated, Bob authenticates the message (an event we will call “BA”) depending on how well his measured
signatures matches Alice declarations. More specifically, he authenticates if he finds less than sapUSDL mismatches
(−1’s). Here, 0 ≤ sa < 1 is an internal parameter of the the protocol.
Subsequently, Bob forwards Alice’s declaration to Charlie, or in the case of forging he forwards his own declarations
which supposedly came from Alice. Charlie verifies (event “CV”) that the message came from Alice, if he finds less
than svpUSDL mismatches, where sv is an internal parameter which has to satisfy sa < sv < 1. If Charlie finds more
mismatches then he rejects (event “CR”). Note here that we choose Bob to be the first party to receive the declaration
in order to authenticate, while Charlie is the party receiving the forwarded message and verifying it. This choice is
arbitrary.
The protocol is aborted in two different cases. Firstly, abort occurs if either Bob or Charlie obtain too many or
too few unambiguous outcomes in the distribution stage. More precisely, abort occurs if the total number of observed
unambiguous outcomes (for either Bob or Charlie) is outide the interval [(pUSD − δ)L, (pUSD + δ)L] [21], where δ
is called the unambiguous count tolerance and will be suitably chosen later. Secondly, abort occurs if either Bob or
Charlie observe more than rL photon detection events at the null-ports of the multiport, again in the distribution
stage. This could mean that the quantum signatures received from Alice were not identical, or, as we will clarify
later, that Bob attempted to forge actively. Note however, that the null-port abort case will not be required to prove
security against repudiation and only appears in the analysis of active forging attempts. We will call the event in
which Bob does not abort “BNA”, while the event Charlie does not abort “CNA”.
7For the protocol to be correct we will require that Bob authenticates, Charlie verifies and neither aborts if all parties
are honest, except with negligible probability. In particular we will require that the probability
P (correct) = P (BA,CV,BNA,CNA), (6)
tends to unity exponentially quickly in the quantum signature length L.
Concerning security statements, we will deem the protocol secure against repudiation if the probability of Bob
authenticating, Charlie rejecting, and neither of them aborting occurs only with exponentially small probability in L
for any attack strategy by Alice. We will thus need to show that
P (rep) = P (BA,CR,BNA,CNA) (7)
decays exponentially quickly in L. In the proof of security against repudiation, which we present here, we will actually
bound the probability P (BA,CR) by an exponentially decaying value, but this will then bound P (rep) as well, given
that P (BA,CR,BNA,CNA) ≤ P (BA,CR).
Forging occurs if Bob sends his declaration, without having access to the declaration of Alice, and subsequently
Charlie verifies, and neither party aborts. Thus we will require that the probability of such an event, that is,
P (forge) = P (CV,BNA,CNA), (8)
again decays exponentially quickly in L. In our proofs we will actually bound P (CV,BNA|CNA), which is a bound
for P (forge) as well, since P (CV,BNA,CNA) ≤ P (CV,BNA|CNA).
Note that our definitions concern one isolated run of the protocol, which is a flavor of security sometimes called
stand-alone security. Stronger security claims, such as composable security claims, we leave for future work.
We will also use the following forms of Hoeffding’s inequalities [12].
Lemma 1 Let X1, · · · , XL be independent random variables, each attaining values 0 or 1. Let X¯ = 1/L
∑
Xi be the
empirical mean of the variables, and let E(X¯) be the expected value of X¯. Then for all t ≥ 0 we have
P (X¯ − E(X¯) ≥ t) ≤ exp(−2t2L) (9)
P (E(X¯)− X¯ ≥ t) ≤ exp(−2t2L) (10)
P (|X¯ − E(X¯)| ≥ t) ≤ 2 exp(−2t2L). (11)
A final point to stress is that here, as in the main paper, we will deal with the ideal case, where there are no losses
and imperfections in the apparatus. Dealing with the experimentally implementable set-up is ongoing work. We have
however included some parameters that are absolutely necessary only for the non-ideal case.
B. The multiport
The multiport is a passive linear optical device with 4 input modes and 4 output modes, comprising four 50:50
beamsplitters. Two of the input modes always contain the vacuum state. The beam splitters we use act on the field
operators according to (
aˆ†out
bˆ†out
)
=
1√
2
(
1 1
1 -1
)(
aˆ†in
bˆ†in
)
. (12)
The multiport and the input-output relations for coherent state inputs are illustrated in Figure 2. The top two beam
splitters are held by Bob and the lower two by Charlie. Since two of the four input modes of the multiport are always
set to the vacuum state by Bob and Charlie, we will refer to the remaining two modes as the input modes of the
multiport. For an input state where two of the input modes are in the vacuum state while the other two are coherent
states α and β, the multiport acts according to
|α〉B ⊗ |β〉C ⊗ |0〉B′ ⊗ |0〉C′ →
∣∣∣∣α+ β2
〉
Bs
⊗
∣∣∣∣α+ β2
〉
Cs
⊗
∣∣∣∣α− β2
〉
Bn
⊗
∣∣∣∣α− β2
〉
Cn
. (13)
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In Bob
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B
B'
C
C'
BS
Bn
Cn
CS
FIG. 2: The multiport with the input-output relations given in terms of the coherent state basis.
Alice controls the (non-vacuum) input states of Bob and Charlie. We will assume that she can send the most general
mixed entangled state of the form
ρBC =
∑
i
pi |ψi〉BC 〈ψi|BC . (14)
The state ρBC refers to a single element pair (Bob and Charlie’s corresponding pair) of the signature. Rewriting this
state in terms of its purification, with the help of a (fictitious) environment, we can write it as a pure state in an
extended Hilbert space,
|ψin〉BCE =
∑
(pi)
1/2 |ψi〉BC ⊗ |i〉E (15)
which can be rewritten again using the (scaled) P-representation as
|ψin〉BCE =
∫ ∑
i
Pi(α, β) |α〉B ⊗ |β〉C ⊗ |i〉E dαdβ. (16)
The effect of the multiport on the total state (where we have included the two extra vacuum input states) is
|ψout〉Bs,Cs,Bn,Cn,E =
∫ ∑
i
Pi(α, β)
∣∣∣∣α+ β2
〉
Bs
⊗
∣∣∣∣α+ β2
〉
Cs
⊗
∣∣∣∣α− β2
〉
Bn
⊗
∣∣∣∣α− β2
〉
Cn
⊗ |i〉E dαdβ. (17)
From this expression, one can directly see that the reduced density matrix of the output signal-port of Bob is equal
to that of Charlie,
ρBs = TrCs,Bn,Cn,E(|ψout〉 〈ψout|) = ρCs = TrBs,Bn,Cn,E(|ψout〉 〈ψout|). (18)
Furthermore, one can see that the resulting state, is symmetric under swap of Bs with Cs, which is a property,
in general stronger than simply stating that their reduced density matrices are equal. Note, that we have assumed
that the initial state of this particular element of the signature we consider here, could have been entangled with
9any other system, since we gave as initial state a general mixed state (the mixture could have come from tracing out
some entangled environment). This is captured by the “environment” degree of freedom that appears above as the
state |i〉E . Moreover, the state of this element of the signature, could have been entangled with other elements of the
signature, and the resulting state would still be symmetric under swap of Bs with Cs for each element of the signature
separately. For example, the two element state
1/
√
2(|1〉B1 |1〉B2 |−1〉C1 |−1〉C2 + |−1〉B1 |−1〉B2 |1〉C1 |1〉C2), (19)
while the reduce density matrices for B1 and C1 are identical and similarly for B2 and C2, it is not symmetric under
swap of subsystems, and thus this state could not be the output of the multiport. Operatively, this entails that,
regardless of the prior measurement outcomes Bob and Charlie could have obtained, the unmeasured system is still
symmetric under the swaps of Bob and Charlie’s signature element pairs. This stronger property will be important
in proving security against coherent repudiation attacks.
The multiport we consider here has two recipients, but it can also be generalized to many recipients [2].
C. Security against repudiation
In a repudiation event, Alice manipulates the quantum signature states [22] which are sent in the distribution stage,
in such a way that during the messaging stage, the same declaration will be confirmed by one party (checking against
the threshold sa) but rejected when forwarded to another party (who checks against the threshold sv). As we have
defined earlier, repudiation is successful, if Bob authenticates, Charlie rejects and there is no abort. To bound on this
probability, we can consider the minimum of the following two probabilities, Bob authenticating and Charlie rejecting
to verify, i.e.
P (rep) ≤ P (BA,CR) ≤ min{P (BA), P (CR)}. (20)
There are two things to note, to understand intuitively why such a bound would be useful. First, we should note that
due to the symmetricity of the multiport P (BA) and P (CR) are not independent. Second, we should note that the
threshold for Bob authenticating is lower than that of Charlie verifying.
We will first consider individual strategies by Alice and then generalize to general separable strategies and to general
coherent strategies where we will prove security by reduction to individual strategies. In other words, we will show
that the best strategy for Alice is given by individual attacks.
1. Security against individual repudiation
In this type of attacks Alice sends quantum signatures, possibly different, to Bob and Charlie. Each pair of
Bob’s and Charlie’s corresponding quantum signature elements are not correlated with others (classically or through
entanglement), but are not necessarily identical, pair to pair. That is, the global state of the quantum signature is
in a factorized form, with respect to the partition in different signature element pairs. There may be entanglement
within each Bob-Charlie signature element pair. Because Bob and Charlie pass their quantum signatures through
the multiport, the outbound quantum signature element at the signal ports of Bob and Charlie is always symmetric
under swap of Bob and Charlie. That is, the quantum signatures Bob and Charlie collect at their multiport signal
ports are such that the reduced density matrix for each element of the signature of Bob is the same as Charlie’s.
Bob’s (Charlie’s) measured signature agrees/disagrees or neither (ambiguous outcome), with the declared signature
for the ith element, with probability pi1, p
i
−1, p
i
0. Those probabilities, if the multiport is ideal, are identical for Bob
and Charlie. We can define the average probabilities p¯j = 1/L
∑
i p
i
j , with j ∈ {1,−1, 0}. Furthermore, we define as
X¯−1 the empirical (observed) percentage of mismatches over the total number (L) of elements of the signature.
It is easy to see that Bob authenticating means that X¯−1 ≤ sapUSD, which using Eq. (10) leads to
P (BA) = P (p¯−1 − X¯−1 ≥ p¯−1 − sapUSD) ≤ exp(−2(p¯−1 − sapUSD)2L), (21)
provided that p¯−1 ≥ sapUSD+ ǫ′. Note that ǫ′ is an arbitrarily small positive number. We note that if this is satisfied,
the probability decays exponentially.
Charlie failing to verify means that X¯−1 ≥ svpUSD which using Eq. (9) leads to
P (CR) = P (X¯−1 − p¯−1 ≥ svpUSD − p¯−1) ≤ exp(−2(svpUSD − p¯−1)2L) (22)
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provided that p¯−1 ≤ svpUSD − ǫ′. Alice’s only freedom, in her attempt to repudiate, is to choose different pij ’s. In
reality, Alice does not have full freedom for these choices (as the POVM elements of Bob and Charlie’s measurements
do not have orthogonal supports), but since we are looking for a bound, we may assume a worst-case setting and
assume that she does have full freedom. Moreover, it is clear from the conditions we have obtained so far that only
the averages of pi−1, i.e. p¯−1 are relevant for the bound on the repudiation probability we are attempting to establish.
Therefore, provided that we choose
sv > sa, (23)
the probability for repudiation decays exponentially for all choices of p¯−1. From Eq. (20), we can see that Alice’s
best strategy to achieve repudiation is to choose p¯−1 in such a way that the minimum of BA and CR is the greatest.
From Eq’s (21-22) we get that the optimum value is for p¯−1 =
pUSD
2
(sv + sa). This gives the following bound for
repudiation under individual attacks,
P (rep) ≤ exp(−p
2
USD(sv − sa)2
2
L). (24)
It is interesting to note that there is an optimal value of p¯−1 from Alice’s point of view, and that her repudiation
probability depends on this. Therefore, for the given bound we consider, it is no better for her to choose different
values for different pi−1, and thus a strategy where Alice sends identical states for each signature element is at least
as effective a full individual strategy for Alice.
2. Security against collective and coherent repudiation
As we have already mentioned, we will prove security against collective and coherent attacks by showing that those
attacks reduce to the individual attacks we already considered. Note that in USD-based QDS (this may also hold
for a broader class of QDS protocols), the success or failure of repudiation depends on the distribution of classical
outcomes Bob and Charlie have. In the proof of security against repudiation against individual attacks, we required
the following two assumptions on the distribution of these outcomes:
1. element independence – the distribution of outcomes for Bob/Charlie for the kth signature element is independent
from other elements
2. Bob/Charlie symmetricity – the marginal probability distributions of outcomes for the kth element for Charlie
and Bob are equal.
The first property is justified by the the type of attack we allow Alice, and the second by the symmetrization
property of the multiport. Note that we have not used any assumption on the values of the probabilities for different
outcomes. As mentioned, in practice, if Alice uses individual attacks, not all probability distributions obeying the
above two conditions are obtainable (since the measurements are not rank-1 projectors). In particular, she can achieve
probabilities distributions that arise from acting at a general single element state (ρBi,Ci) with the corresponding
POVM (ΠBj ⊗ ΠCk ), where j, k ∈ {1, 0,−1} and {Πj}j is the three POVM elements corresponding to the USD
measurement that Bob and Charlie carry out. However, the security against individual repudiation was proven
without considering this additional restriction on the ability of Alice to manipulate the probabilities. This will mean
that we can use the same arguments for security against the most general attacks.
In the following, we will encode the distributions of classical outcomes of Charlie and Bob as quantum states: the
outcome o ∈ {−1, 0, 1} we denote with the state |o〉 , such that
〈o| o′〉 =
{
0, o 6= o′
1, o = o′
(25)
Therefore, any probability distribution of outcomes corresponds to a mixture of states {|o〉 〈o|}o∈{−1,0,1}, without loss
of generality.
From Alice’s point of view (i.e. without the knowledge of the obtained outcome), the individual measurements
Bob and Charlie perform on their systems are CPTP maps producing mixtures of states {|o〉 〈o|}o∈{−1,0,1}, where
the probability of the state |o〉〈o| is given by Tr(Πoρ), if the input state is ρ. For each signature element, the joint
post-measurement state of Bob and Charlie is then of the form
σBC =
∑
oB ,oC
p(oB, oC)|oB〉〈oB |B ⊗ |oC〉〈oC |C . (26)
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In general, the post-measurement state of Bob and Charlie’s systems is then a separable state of the form
ρmeas =
∑
o1
B
,o1
C
,...,oL
B
,oL
C
p(o1B, o
1
C , . . . , o
L
B, o
L
C)
L⊗
k=1
σ
o1
B
,o1
C
,...,oL
B
,oL
C
Bk,Ck
. (27)
Note that the probability of successful repudiation depends only on the state ρmeas. Moreover, the processes which
determines whether repudiation occured or not, can be denoted as a map Rep which takes ρmeas as input and outputs
one bit (encoded in the orthonormal states |suc〉〈suc|, |fail〉〈fail| denoting success or failure of repudiation),
Rep(ρmeas) = pρmeas |suc〉〈suc|+ (1− pρmeas)|fail〉〈fail|. (28)
Since the map Rep is physical, it is also a linear map. Moreover the success probability of repudiation, given the state
ρmeas, is given by
Tr [|suc〉〈suc|Rep(ρmeas)] . (29)
But then for the probability of success or failure given a convex combination of input states
ρmeas =
∑
i
p(i)ρi (30)
is given by
Tr [|suc〉〈suc|Rep(ρmeas)] = Tr
[
|suc〉〈suc|Rep(
∑
i
p(i)ρi)
]
(31)
=
∑
i
p(i)Tr
[|suc〉〈suc|Rep(ρi)] =∑
i
p(i)pρ
i
. (32)
Since the last expression above is a convex combination of positive reals, it holds that∑
i
p(i)pρ
i ≤ max
i
pρ
i
. (33)
That is, given a mixed input state of the form ρmeas =
∑
i p(i)ρ
i, an upper bound of the repudiation probability is
obtained on one of the elements of the mixture ρi. Now, applying this convexity argument to the input state of the
form
ρmeas =
∑
o1
B
,o1
C
,...,oL
B
,oL
C
p(o1B , o
1
C , . . . , o
L
B , o
L
C)
L⊗
k=1
σ
o1
B
,o1
C
,...,oL
B
,oL
C
Bk,Ck
(34)
we see that an upper bound of the repudiation probability can be achieved by considering the input state
L⊗
k=1
σ
o1
B
,o1
C
,...,oL
B
,oL
C
Bk,Ck
, (35)
for some sequence of outputs o1B, o
1
C , . . . , o
L
B, o
L
C .
Assume next that for every input state
ρmeas =
∑
o1
B
,o1
C
,...,oL
B
,oL
C
p(o1B , o
1
C , . . . , o
L
B , o
L
C)
L⊗
k=1
σ
o1
B
,o1
C
,...,oL
B
,oL
C
Bk,Ck
(36)
obtained through Charlie’s and Bob’s measurements as prescribed in our protocol, it holds that for all sequences of
outputs o1B , o
1
C , . . . , o
L
B , o
L
C and every k, the state σ
o1
B
,o1
C
,...,oL
B
,oL
C
Bk,Ck
is symmetric under the swap of Bob’s and Charlie’s
systems. Then, two properties hold:
1. The probability of repudiation, given the state ρmeas, is upper bounded by the repudiation probability given
the state
⊗L
k=1 σ
o1
B
,o1
C
,...,oL
B
,oL
C
Bk,Ck
, for some sequence of outcomes o1B, o
1
C , . . . , o
L
B, o
L
C .
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2. The probability distributions of outcomes stemming from the state
⊗L
k=1 σ
o1
B
,o1
C
,...,oL
B
,oL
C
Bk,Ck
satisfy element inde-
pendence and symmetricity with respect to Bob/Charlie as we discussed previously.
But this means that general repudiation attacks cannot have a higher repudiation probability than individual repu-
diation attacks. For the latter we have shown that the repudiation probability diminishes exponentially in L, and
therefore the same holds for general repudiation attacks.
What remains to be proven is that for all possible states Alice could have prepared, the post-measurement state of
Charlie and Bob can be written in the form
ρmeas =
∑
o1
B
,o1
C
,...,oL
B
,oL
C
p(o1B, o
1
C , . . . , o
L
B, o
L
C)
L⊗
k=1
σ
o1
B
,o1
C
,...,oL
B
,oL
C
Bk,Ck
, (37)
where for all sequences of outputs o1B , o
1
C , . . . , o
L
B , o
L
C and every k, the state σ
o1
B
,o1
C
,...,oL
B
,oL
C
Bk,Ck
is symmetric under the
swap of Bob’s and Charlie’s systems. This we now prove.
Let ρB1,C1,...,BL,CL be any state of Bob’s and Charlie’s system, collected at their signal ports, and let SWAPk be
the unitary operator swapping the kth system of Charlie and Bob [23]. Due to the symmetrization property of the
multiport, given by eq. (17) it holds that for all k,
ρB1,C1,...,BL,CL = SWAPk (ρB1,C1,...,BL,CL)SWAP
†
k . (38)
After the measurement of the first signature element by both Charlie and Bob the state of the system is∑
o1
B
,o1
C
p(o1B , o
1
C)
(|o1B〉〈o1B | ⊗ |o1C〉〈o1C |)⊗ ρo1B ,o1CB2,C2,...,BL,CL . (39)
Due to the symmetrization property, we have that∑
o1
B
,o1
C
p(o1B, o
1
C)
(|o1B〉〈o1B | ⊗ |o1C〉〈o1C |)⊗ ρo1B ,o1CB2,C2,...,BL,CL = (40)
∑
o1
B
,o1
C
p(o1B, o
1
C)
(
SWAPk
(|o1B〉〈o1B | ⊗ |o1C〉〈o1C |)SWAP †k)⊗ ρo1B,o1CB2,C2,...,BL,CL (41)
so this state can be written as∑
o1
B
,o1
C
p(o1B, o
1
C)
(
1/2
(|o1B〉〈o1B | ⊗ |o1C〉〈o1C |+ |o1C〉〈o1C | ⊗ |o1B〉〈o1B |))⊗ ρo1B ,o1CB2,C2,...,BL,CL = (42)
∑
o1
B
,o1
C
p(o1B, o
1
C)σ
o1
B
,o1
C
B1,C1
⊗ ρo1B ,o1CB2,C2,...,BL,CL (43)
where the state σ
o1
B
,o1
C
B1,C1
is symmetric under the desired swap. Crucially, each of the residual, non-measured states
ρ
o1
B
,o1
C
B2,C2,...,BL,CL
corresponding to each of the possible measurement outcomes o1B, o
1
C again have the same symmetricity
property as given in equation (38). To see this, note that the multiport acts independently on each of the L subsystems
so the action of the measurement on the first subsystem commutes with the action of the multiport on the second.
But then the state of the second subsystem can be imagined to undergo the multiport after the measurement of the
first, in which case it is clear the residual states will be symmetric as well, for every outcome. Thus the process can
be iterated, obtaining the state of the form
ρmeas =
∑
o1
B
,o1
C
,...,oL
B
,oL
C
p(o1B , o
1
C , . . . , o
L
B, o
L
C)σ
o1
B
,o1
C
B1,C1
⊗ σo1B ,o1C ,o2B,o2CB2,C2 ⊗ · · · ⊗ σ
o1
B
,o1
C
,...,oL
B
,oL
C
BL,CL
. (44)
But, by construction, for each k the state
σ
o1
B
,o1
C
,...ok
B
,ok
C
Bk,Ck
(45)
is symmetric under Bob/Charlie subsystem swap. Thus, the post-measurement state of Charlie and Bob has the
desired property, and we have shown that the upper bound on the repudiation probability of Alice for individual
attacks, given by Eq. (24), also holds for general attacks.
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D. Security against Forging
As noted in the main text, forging is defined as when a cheating party (Bob) convinces an honest party (Charlie)
that Alice had sent a classical message k, when Alice has sent no or another meassage. To do so, the malevolent
party needs to guess Alice’s declaration. Throughout this section, when we mention declaration, and matching and
mismatching with the declaration, this is the “fake” declaration of Bob, which is made after Bob uses all his resources
to make the best possible guess. Note also that security against forging as defined also ensures security against
message tampering.
There are two natural classifications of forging attack, characterizing the powers available to the forger, and charac-
terizing whether the forger is malevolent from the distribution stage or just during the messaging phase. For the first
classification attack we distinguish individual (which consists of the identical attacks (IID) and the non-identical but
uncorrelated (INID)), collective and coherent attacks, as was done for repudiation. Concerning the second classifica-
tion, the forging can be passive, where Bob simply attempts to guess the signature in such a way that his declaration
gets accepted by Charlie, but is honest during the distribution stage. Otherwise, forging can be active where Bob
is dishonest also during the distribution stage, where he attempts to modify Charlies quantum signature so that it
helps him subsequently during the messaging stage to make Charlie agree with his own declaration. Here we prove
the security against all attacks except the coherent attacks, for both passive and active modes.
From Eq. (23) it is clear that it is easier to attempt to forge a message in the verification stage rather than in the
authentication stage. In other words, it is easier to convince Charlie that Bob forwards the message received from
Alice, than Charlie convincing Bob that he directly sends the message (pretending to be Alice).
We have defined as successful forging the scenario where Charlie verifies the fake message sent by Bob and there
was no abort. To bound the probability for this, we remind the reader that P (forge) = P (CV,BNA,CNA) ≤
P (CV,BNA|CNA). By this definition, Bob does not abort no matter what happens in order to succeed in forging.
The probability we use to bound P (forge) is conditional on Charlie not aborting and therefore the number of
unambiguous outcomes K is in the interval [pUSD − δ, pUSD + δ]L. To put a bound on the forging probability, we
assume the worst case scenario, which is that Charlie obtined the lowest possible fraction of allowed unambiguous
outcomes K = (pUSD−δ)L, as in this case it is more likely for Bob to cause a sufficiently small fraction of mismatches,
whatever strategy he uses.
1. Security against passive collective forging
In passive attacks, Bob’s optimal strategy is defined by a measurement he performs on the quantum signature,
which will produce a declaration which has the highest probability of being accepted by Charlie. By restricting Bob
to collective powers, we mean that Bob can perform adaptive measurements, but on individual subsystems only. In
this case, since all the signature elements are independently distributed, it is clear that the optimal measurement for
each subsystem cannot depend on prior measurement outcomes, so adaptivity cannot help Bob.
One could wonder whether Bob’s best strategy would involve an independent, non-identically distributed (INID)
passive attack (i.e. differing measurements per elements of the signatures). Bob is successful in forging if he manages
to correctly guess a sufficient percentage of signs of the signature. Failure or success can be defined for each element
of the signature, i.e. if Bob guessed correctly for the k’th pulse. It is therefore clear that the best overall strategy
would be to repeat, L times (once per element), the best guess for each element, which will be the minimum-error
measurement, by definition. Moreover, since all the states he receive are not correlated, it is unlikely any coherent
measurement could outperform individual measurements. However, since we for now only consider a forger limited
to collective strategies, this is not central to our arguments.
Having established that the best strategy for passive collective attacks is an IID attack with minimum-error mea-
surements, we proceed to bound the probability of success for this type of attacks. We begin by considering the
security of our protocol from passive forging attacks. We define Y¯−1 := X¯−1(L/K) to be the empirically observed
percentage of mismatches over unambiguous outcomes (note that X¯−1 is the percentage of mismatches over the to-
tal number of pulses). Bob succeeds in forging, if Charlie, after receiving Bob’s (fake) declaration, finds less than
svpUSDL mismatches (X¯−1 ≤ svpUSD), and thus verifies. We need that
Y¯−1 ≤ sv pUSD
pUSD − δ , (46)
where we have taken the worst case scenario, K = (pUSD − δ)L. That is, the smallest K for which Charlie does
not abort. Bob can try to guess the correct signature by making a minimum-error measurement on his copy of the
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quantum signature. The probability of misidentifying is
pmin = 1/2(1−
√
1− e−4α2). (47)
Then using Eq. (10) the probability of forging is bounded as
P (forge) ≤ P
(
pmin − Y¯−1 ≥ pmin − sv pUSD
pUSD − δ
)
≤ exp
(
−2
(
pmin − sv pUSD
pUSD − δ
)2
(pUSD − δ)L
)
, (48)
provided that pmin ≥ sv pUSDpUSD−δ . If this holds, we see that the forging probability decays exponentially in the signature
length L.
2. Security against active forging
For the active forging attacks, we will first consider IID type of attacks where Bob behaves independently and
identically for each quantum signature element. Then we will show that independent, non-identically distributed
strategies (INID) and also collective strategies reduce to, and are not more powerful than, IID strategies.
3. IID active forging attacks
In active strategies, Bob is allowed to alter the quantum signature sent to Charlie during the distribution stage.
By altering the quantum signature Charlie receives, Bob tries to increase his probability to later forge a message.
However, if Bob sends a different state to the multiport, Charlie’s null-port of the multiport will occasionally detect
photons. By demanding that the protocol is aborted if many photons are detected at the multiport’s null-port, Charlie
limits the degree to which Bob can manipulate his quantum signature, reducing Bob’s active attacks to (modified)
passive.
We will call the states that Bob sends to Charlie the response states, depicted in Figure 3. For the kth signature
element, let the response state be η =
∫
β
P (β)|β〉〈β|d2β. Then the probability of obtaining a zero photon count on
Charlie’s null-port is given by
Tr
[
|0〉〈0|
∫
β
P (β)| β√
2
− bkα
2
〉〈 β√
2
− bkα
2
|d2β
]
= Tr
[
|bkα
2
〉〈bkα
2
|η′
]
, (49)
where η′ =
∫
β
P (β)|β/√2〉〈β/√2|d2β and bk is the sign of the k’th signature element. The signal mode is then in the
state D(bkα/2)η
′D†(bkα/2) where D(·) denotes the displacement operator.
In a passive strategy, the state in the signal mode would be D(bkα/2)η
′′D†(bkα/2), with η
′′ = |bkα/2〉〈bkα/2|.
Thus, from expression (49), we can see that the the probability of not detecting a photon at Charlie’s multiport
null-port is equal to the expected fidelity between the quantum signature elements Charlie will apply USD to in the
active and passive attack settings, respectively. This is illustrated in Figure 3. Since we have assumed a separable,
identical strategy for Bob for each state, we can use the statistics on this null-port to gauge the distance between the
signature states Charlie measures in passive and separable active strategies. For instance, in the limit of infinite key
lengths, if Charlie always observes the vacuum state on his null-port (i.e. detects no photon), Bob must have been
behaving honestly within the multiport (barring the possibility of coherent attacks on which we will comment later)
so then the expression for the cheating probability is the same as in the passive setting (and equals zero in the limit
of infinite key lengths).
For finite-sized keys, if we can bound the trace distance between the average signal output signature elements in
the passive and active attacks, then we can bound the difference between the measurement outcome probabilities of
Charlie’s USD measurement in the cases of active versus passive attacks. This is ensured by setting an abort threshold
on the multiport null-port photon event count. We will set the threshold to be rL, where r is the fraction of the
quantum signature states which have caused a photon event at Charlie’s null-port during signature distribution, and
L is the length of the quantum signature. Recall, we are assuming that Bob is acting independently and identically
for each signature element state so this fraction can be used to bound the value of Tr(|bkα/2〉〈bkα/2|η′) for an average
signature element state. Let x := 1− Tr(|bkα/2〉〈bkα/2|η′). Then, by the Eq. (11) we have that
P (|x− r| ≥ ǫ) ≤ 2 exp(−2ǫ2L). (50)
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FIG. 3: A) In an active cheating strategy, Bob can interfere within the multiport, and alter one of the states Charlie will mix
on his final beamsplitter. B) The probability of detecting photons depends on the response state η Charlie received from Bob.
The probability of not seeing a photon at the null-port is equal to the expected fidelity between the honest-setting response
state and a ’half’ of the response state denoted η′.
Thus, we have that
1− Tr(|bkα〉〈bkα|η′)) ≤ r + ǫ, (51)
except with probability 2 exp(−2ǫ2L). In the ideal case, we could set the threshold r = 0, as we will do at the end
when we investigate suitable choices of the parameters. For now, we have 1 − Tr(|bkα/2〉〈bkα/2|η′)) ≤ r + ǫ except
with probability 2 exp(−2ǫ2L). The variational distance between the probability distribution of a given measurement
over an altered state is upper bounded by the trace distance between the original and altered state. To obtain a
bound on forging strategies, we need to bound the trace distance. The expected fidelity has a well-known relationship
with the trace distance [18], which leads us to a bound on the trace distance,
DTr(|bkα/2〉〈bkα/2|, η′) ≤
√
1− Tr(|bkα〉〈bkα|η′) ≤
√
r + ǫ. (52)
Note that the bound on the trace distance does not hold with probability 2 exp(−2ǫ2L). In order to set an upper
bound on the forging probability, we will assume the worst case scenario. We will assume that for the cases that the
bound does not hold, successful forging had occurred. We will first examine the capacity of Bob to influence states
Charlies measures at the end of the distribution stage, assuming the bound on the trace distance holds. This will
subsequently affect the matching or mismatching of Charlies quantum signature with Bob’s fake declaration, and thus
will affect the verification or rejection of Bob’s message. To obtain the total forging probability, we will add at the
end the probability that the bound on the trace distance does not hold.
Since the number of unambiguous outcomes allowed if abort does not occur is bounded (more than (pUSD − δ)L),
and we have already assumed that abort does not occur, the best strategy for Bob is clearly to try and steer Charlie’s
outcome towards his declaration, which effectively reduces the percentage of mismatches. The amount he can do this
is bounded by
√
r + ǫ.
Additionally, a cheating Bob has access to the fraction of the state Charlie sends him, giving him a lower minimum
error probability should he choose to measure the entirety of the state using a minimum-error measurements. Recall,
since all the signs of the quantum signatures are chosen uniformly at random, hence independently from each other,
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the minimum-error measurement is the optimal strategy for Bob. The entirety of the system accessible to Bob
yields a coherent state of amplitude
√
3/2α. We will denote the minimum error probability for the minimum-error
measurement by p′min and it is given by
p′min = 1−
1
2
(√
1− e−6α2 + 1
)
. (53)
Below, we will give a cheating probability bound which is not tight. We will assume Bob can both measure the
entirety of the state, and use it in the preparation of the response state, which is not possible in reality, but upper
bounds the cheating probability.
We repeat the analysis we performed for passive attacks, but with modified values for the constants, (i) instead
of pUSD we have pUSD − δ which corresponds to the fewer unambiguous outcomes that occur, (ii) instead of pmin
we have p′min because Bob can use
√
3/2α for his best guess and (iii) the threshold for verification sv is effectively
increased by the ability of Bob to affect Charlies signature towards his declaration by an amount of
√
ǫ+ r. We then
obtain the following expression bounding the cheating probability,
P (forge) ≤ exp
(
−2
(
p′min − sv
pUSD
pUSD − δ −
√
ǫ+ r
)2
(pUSD − δ)L
)
. (54)
As we have already mentioned, the bound on the trace distance we used to derive the expression above holds only
with probability 2 exp(−2ǫ2L). We assume that forging was completely successful for these cases and by the union
bound we then have
P (forge) ≤ exp
(
−2
(
p′min − sv
pUSD
pUSD − δ −
√
ǫ+ r
)2
(pUSD − δ)L
)
+ 2 exp(−2(ǫ)2L), (55)
provided that
p′min − sv
pUSD
pUSD − δ −
√
ǫ + r > 0. (56)
4. INID active forging attacks
In the section above we considered the setting in which cheating Bob employs an identical strategy for each signature
state. Since we could assume that Alice always sends the same signature element state (as this is true up to a local
choice of a reference frame of the coherent phase), this implied that the response states Bob sends are all identical
(when averaged over the possible outcomes Bob may have obtained internally, which he will later use to make his
declaration to Charlie).
Then the null-port photon count directly measured the distance between the honest-case response states, and the
one in the IID active attack, which could then be used to bound the overall cheating probability.
In an INID attack, Bob can use a different (but pre-defined) attack per each pulse. This means that the response
state depends on the position in the signature, that is, the index of the element. However, whatever Bob does, his
strategy can be fully described with the set of response states he sends,
ηtotal =
L⊗
k=1
ηk. (57)
Multiport counts now gauge the distance between the average response state and the honest response state, where
the average response state is given by
ηavg = 1/L
L∑
k=1
ηk. (58)
In the active IID setting, analyzed in the last section, we have used Hoeffding’s inequalities to bound the cheating
probability. Hoeffding’s inequalities give a bound on the probability that the observed average of a sequence of random
variables deviates from the expected average by more than some threshold. However, the only assumption needed
for Hoeffding’s inequalities to be applicable is that the (binary) variables are independent. This assumption is also
satisfied in the case of INID attacks, since the probability distributions in question arise from measurements of a
factorized quantum state. The mean of the realized random variables is directly estimated by estimating the average
state Bob sends, i.e. the state ηavg. Thus, the results for the IID attacks directly hold in the non-identical, but
independent setting.
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5. Collective active forging attacks
In collective forging, Bob’s actions on the kth signature element depend on what he did (that is the state of his
classical local memory) previously. An example of such a strategy is one where Bob performs USD measurements up
to a certain point. For instance Bob could do USD continuously (as long as he obtains the unambiguous outcome).
Assume he is lucky, and succeeds in being lucky a sufficient number of times that he is certain he will pass verification.
From this point on, it may make sense for Bob to switch to an honest strategy, to reduce the expected average null-port
count from this point on.
The key point is, regardless of what happened internally in Bob, what he did could not depend on what happened
internally in Charlie, as there is no classical communication between them, due to no-signalling. Thus, from Charlie’s
perspective, we can write Bob’s cumulative state as
ηtot =
∑
i1,...,iL
P (i1, . . . , iL)ηi1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ ηiL . (59)
Next, we can without loss of generality assume that Charlie did not perform any measurements on his system,
before he obtained Bob’ declaration. The classical system containing the declaration D we will denote ρD.
Now, Charlie’s process of verification, which we can denote Ver can be written as a
Ver(ρD ⊗ ηDtot) = pη
D
tot |ok〉 〈ok|+
(
1− pηDtot
)
|rej〉 〈rej| (60)
where the states |ok〉 , |rej〉 are orthogonal states of a (qu)bit of Charlie which contains the information whether the
message of Bob is verified or not (rej denoting rejection). The probability p depends on the total input state. Note
that Ver is a deterministic physical process, so a CPTP map, and thus linear. So we have that
Ver(ρD ⊗ ηDtot) =
∑
i1,...,iL
P (i1, . . . , iL)Ver(ρD ⊗ ηDi1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ ηDiL) = (61)
∑
i1,...,iL
P (i1, . . . , iL)
(
pη
D
i1
⊗···⊗ηD
iL |ok〉 〈ok|+
(
1− pηDi1⊗···⊗ηDiL
)
|rej〉 〈rej|
)
. (62)
The probability of cheating is obtained by projecting the state above to the |ok〉 subspace and taking the trace, so
P (forge) = Tr

|ok〉 〈ok| ∑
i1,...,iL
P (i1, . . . , iL)
(
pη
D
i1
⊗···⊗ηD
iL |ok〉 〈ok|+
(
1− pηDi1⊗···⊗ηDiL
)
|rej〉 〈rej|
) . (63)
Since everything above is linear, we have
P (forge) =
∑
i1,...,iL
P (i1, . . . , iL)p
ηD
i1
⊗···⊗ηD
iL . (64)
Thus the cheating probability is just a convex combination of the cheating probabilities of the individual states, and
is maximized for one of the factorized states.
E. Correctness of the protocol
To confirm the correctness of the protocol, we must check that if all parties behave honestly, then Bob will authen-
ticate and Charlie will verify the forwarded message and neither will abort. Here we are considering the ideal case,
where the multiport is perfect and that there are no losses or noise. The non-ideal, experimentally implementable
case, is work in progress.
In the honest, ideal case, neither Bob nor Charlie ever rejects a message. However, they may abort. In particular,
as mentioned in Section I, there are two types of abort. In the honest, ideal case, Charlie and Bob will never detect
any photons at their null-port of the multiport, and thus the only reason to abort that can occur is if they receive
fewer or more than expected unambiguous outcomes. This happens if Bob (and similarly Charlie) find that they have
unambiguous outcomes outside the interval [(pUSD − δ)L, (pUSD + δ)L] which according to Eq. (11) leads to the
probability of honest abort (due to, say, Bob aborting)
P (honest abort Bob) = P (|1− X¯0| ≥ δ) ≤ 2 exp(−2δ2L). (65)
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The probability of Bob not aborting in the honest case is [1−P (honest abort Bob)] and similarly for Charlie. Therefore
the probability for neither of them aborting is bounded from below by
P (honest not abort) = P (correct) ≥ (1− 2 exp(−2δ2L))2 . (66)
We can see that this approaches unit probability exponentially quickly in the signature length L.
F. Constraints and Choices of Parameters
In this section we review the main expressions and constraints on the parameters that we have obtained from
correctness, security against repudiation and forging. We will also suggest a suitable choice for the parameters. The
probabilities of correct execution, repudiation and forging are bounded by the expressions
P (correct) ≥ (1− 2 exp(−2δ2L))2 (67)
P (rep) ≤ exp(−p
2
USD(sv − sa)2
2
L) (68)
P (forge) ≤ exp
(
−2
(
p′min − sv
pUSD
pUSD − δ −
√
ǫ+ r
)2
(pUSD − δ)L
)
+ 2 exp(−2(ǫ)2L). (69)
Moreover we have the two constraints
sv > sa (70)
p′min − sv
pUSD
pUSD − δ −
√
ǫ+ r > 0. (71)
The parameters that appear are δ, sv, sa, r, ǫ, and p
′
min, pUSD, the latter being functions of α which is the amplitude
of the coherent states. Since we are dealing with the ideal case, we can make the following two simplifications. We
can set r = 0, i.e. demand that there are no photons detected at the null-port of the multiport, and furthermore,
we can set sa = 0, in other words authenticate only if there is not a single mismatch. Note however, that these
simplifications are not desirable in the non-ideal case, because it will greatly increase the probability of abort even
when all participants are honest, and lead to low robustness of the protocol.
From its definition, we can see that δ, the unambiguous count tolerance should be function of pUSD, while from
Eq. (69) we see that sv and ǫ should be functions of p
′
min. One possible choice which guarantees that the protocol is
both correct and secure is δ = 0.1pUSD, and sv =
√
ǫ = p′min/4. We then obtain the simplified expressions
P (cor) ≥ (1− 2 exp(−0.02p2USDL))2 (72)
P (rep) ≤ exp(−0.03(pUSDp′min)2L) (73)
P (forge) ≤ exp(−0.4p′2minpUSDL) + 2 exp(−0.008p′4minL). (74)
We can easily see that the probability of correctness if all parties are honest approaches unity exponentially quickly,
and the probabilities of repudiation and forging tend to zero exponentially quickly.
Finally, one may wonder what would be a suitable choice of amplitude α. When α tends to zero then pUSD will tend
zero, whereas when α tends to infinity, then p′min tends to zero, and neither is satisfactory. The first corresponds to
very low intensity, where there are almost no unambiguous outcomes. The second corresponds to very high intensity,
and in this case it becomes easy to forge, because we are now in the classical regime where a forger can guess the
state correctly with high probability, i.e. p′min → 0. A suitable choice that simnultaneously optimizes all expressions
considered here is difficult to find analytically. However, with the choices made above, taking α ∼ 0.2 is a reasonable
choice. With this indicative choice of α we obtain p′min = 0.27 and pUSD = 0.077. We can see that if for example
L = 106 (which can be practical if high repetition rate pulse lasers (>100MHz) are used to generate the coherent
states), the probability for correct protocol is very close to unity P (correct) ≥ 1 − 10−52, while the repudiation
probability is very close to zero P (rep) ≤ 2×10−6 and similarly the forging probability P (forge) ≤ 0.7×10−18 (using
the bounds we derived in this paper which are not tight).
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